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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3947 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM R. JONES, 
                         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNKNOWN D.O.C. BUS DRIVER AND TRANSPORTATION CREW, 
in their personal and professional capacity;  
SUPERINTENDENT PITTSBURGH SCI; CAPT. MOHRING 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-01174) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 16, 2017 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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William R. Jones is a former Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se.  In August 
2016, Jones commenced this civil rights action in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania alleging that, in late 2013, while he was being 
transported between SCI Pine Grove and SCI Smithfield, a Department of Corrections 
(DOC) bus driver violated his constitutional rights in several respects.  Specifically, Jones 
alleged that on the way to SCI Pine Grove, the bus driver harassed and threatened him in 
retaliation for his having spoken to another inmate on the bus, and intentionally switched 
his property box—which included his legal materials—with the other inmate’s.  He 
further alleged that on the way back to SCI Smithfield, the bus driver placed him in the 
segregation cage for “no other reason than his malicious pleasure and to psychologically 
intimidate [Jones].”  (Compl. 3, Doc. No. 3) (punctuation altered).  Based on these 
allegations, Jones claimed that he had been denied access to the courts and that his rights 
under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments had been violated.   
The District Court granted Jones’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and 
screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court initially 
referred the complaint to a Magistrate Judge who recommended that it be dismissed as 
time-barred.  Following Jones’s objections, however, the District Court determined that 
Jones’s claims were timely and proceeded to consider whether he had stated a claim on 
which relief could be granted.  See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Upon review, the District Court 
concluded that he had not.  The District Court then considered whether to afford Jones a 
chance to cure the deficiencies in his complaint, but determined that amendment would 
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be futile.  See Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 
251 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment—
irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim 
unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 
235 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).     
Accordingly, by order entered September 30, 2016, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint.  Jones now appeals from the District Court’s order.1   
 We will vacate the District Court’s order.  While we agree with the District Court 
that Jones’s initial pro se pleading was insufficient, we cannot agree that amendment 
necessarily would have been futile—that is, that Jones could not include additional 
factual allegations to cure the pleading deficiencies.  For example, although the District 
Court correctly noted that Jones had not alleged sufficient injury to support an access-to-
the-courts claim, we see no reason why he should not have been permitted to provide 
additional details regarding the injury he suffered as a result of the bus driver’s actions.  
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (stating that a plaintiff seeking damages 
for the denial of access to the courts must show that the alleged deprivation of legal 
material led to an actual injury, that is, “the loss or rejection of a legal claim”).  Indeed, 
Jones includes several additional facts in his brief on appeal, noting, for instance, that as a 
result of the bus driver’s actions, he was forced “to go to court without [his] legal papers, 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s dismissal of Jones’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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which stop[ped him] from presenting [his] argument for [his] post-conviction motion,” 
causing him to lose his post-conviction motion “forever.”  (Br. 8.)  In light of this 
contention, Jones should be permitted an opportunity to set forth additional allegations to 
state an access-to-the-courts claim, as well as any other claims he previously pleaded and 
still wishes to pursue.  This is particularly so given that Jones’s objections to the Report 
and Recommendation reasonably focused on the Magistrate Judge’s timeliness analysis 
rather than the viability of his claims.   
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand this matter 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
